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 Abstract 
The low-lying atoll states of Tuvalu and Kiribati have gained international attention 
due to their vulnerability to climate change and associated sea-level rise. They have 
been referred to as ‘sinking islands’, with some commentators predicting they could 
become completely uninhabitable within a generation. This work acknowledges 
that climate change is having a negative impact on these island communities. 
However, it would be too simplistic to only focus on this as the key factor in patterns 
of migration from the outer islands to the urban centres of each state. There are 
multiple drivers for both internal and international migration, and also for the desire 
to reside in these communities for as long as they remain habitable. Through 
fieldwork interviews with residents of Vaitupu, an outer island of Tuvalu and 
Abaiang, an outer island of Kiribati, this work seeks to understand the key 
determinants in residents deciding whether or not to relocate. Interviews were also 
conducted with former members of these communities that are now resident in the 
respective urban centres of Funafuti and Tarawa. Further context was supplied via 
interviews with government officials, donor agencies and civil society groups.  
Keywords: climate change, discourse analysis, migration, relocation, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu 
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Background and study objectives 
 The Pacific island state of Tuvalu has a population of approximately 11,000 with 
half of this number living in the main urban centre of Funafuti. It has a total land 
area of only 26 square kilometres, which ranks it as the fourth smallest state in the 
world. However, it has a vast exclusive economic zone in excess of three quarters 
of a million square kilometres. Kiribati has a similar land to ocean area ratio with 
an exclusive economic area of close to three and a half million square kilometres. 
Kiribati’s total population is slightly over 100,000 of whom, again, roughly half 
live on the main island of Tarawa. Both island states are made up of several atolls 
and islets with marked concentrations of their citizens based in the administrative 
capitals. Tuvalu and Kiribati face particular development challenges in terms of 
their relatively limited land-based resources, difficulties in accessing and 
capitalising on their marine-based resources, distance from markets and high 
importation and transport costs. They have also been described as being on the 
‘front line’ with regard to the negative impacts of climate change and sea-level rise.  
The vulnerability of coastal communities and low-lying atoll states to the impacts 
of climate change and sea-level rise has been recognized for the last two decades. 
This was demonstrated by the formation of the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) prior to the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janiero in 1992. Since this 
landmark meeting there have been regular international conferences aimed at 
promoting sustainable development and highlighting the species and communities 
most at risk from changing climate and weather patterns. A growing body of 
literature has focused on the low-lying atoll states, notably Tuvalu and Kiribati, as 
being at risk from climate change.  (see Barnett and Campbell, 2010; McNamara 
and Gibson, 2009; Mimura et al., 2007; Patel, 2006; Barnett and Adger, 2003). 
At the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of Parties to discuss the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the representatives of 
Tuvalu and Kiribati argued strongly for the need to limit global temperature 
warming to 1.5°C. Simultaneously the international scientific congress on climate 
change contended that ‘warming above 2°C would be very difficult for 
contemporary societies and ecosystems to cope with’ (Climate Congress, 2009). 
There is now broad agreement that warming beyond 2°C is likely and will result in 
numerous negative impacts on societies and ecological systems across the world, 
especially for low-lying coastal communities (Parry et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2009). 
These communities will have to contend with a series of interconnected impacts, 
such as declining freshwater and food security and diminishing land availability, as 
a result of sea-level rise and an increasing number of extreme weather events 
(Adger and Barnett, 2009).  
As Hayward-Jones (2010: 2) predicted: ‘What is at stake over the next decade is 
not a sinking island but the very viability of life on this fragile atoll state. The 
landmass of Tuvalu will still exist in 2020 but it may be unable to support the 
population’. This statement is representative of many of the more dramatic 
interpretations of future scenarios for both Tuvalu and Kiribati. Migration is often 
seen as unavoidable as environmental degradation, particularly with regard to 
freshwater resources, leads to an inability for these communities to remain self-
sufficient and viable. However, such analyses tend to overlook the strength of 
attachment communities feel to their homeland, and also the ability of communities 
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to continue to reside in areas where they are more reliant on imported foodstuffs 
than on what they are able to produce locally. In some respects it is surprising the 
latter point is overlooked as the majority of the world’s population now live in urban 
as opposed to rural environments and are far from self-sufficient. Clearly access to 
drinking water is an essential resource, but the ability to produce food crops is less 
of an issue if communities have the means to purchase imported food. It should also 
be noted that reliance on imported, processed food does have considerable 
implications for health and Pacific island communities have some of the highest 
levels of non-communicable diseases such as obesity, heart disease and diabetes 
(Smith and McMurray, 2000)  
This study is designed to look beyond the externally created and imposed stereotype 
of ‘sinking islands’ and ask the people most impacted by sea-level rise how they 
perceive the changes to their environment and how they are adapting to these 
changes.  
Methodology 
The key respondents in this study were the participants in two community 
workshops organised as part of the European Union / University of the South 
Pacific’s Global Climate Change Alliance project. These took place in Tuvalu and 
Kiribati during November and December 2012. In addition to the workshop 
programmes this project also conducted household surveys in the outer islands of 
each state. The intention was to gather a broad range of responses at the community 
level with regard to how the impacts of climate change were perceived locally and 
what adaptation measures were being identified and implemented. Although 
climate change was an underlying theme throughout these workshops and surveys, 
it quickly became apparent that this was only one among many factors that the 
islanders in these communities took into account when considering possible 
relocation to the capital urban centres, or further overseas.  
Much of the mainstream media coverage of Tuvalu and Kiribati focuses almost 
entirely on the threat of sea-level rise. A rare exception to this was the 2012 royal 
visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge to Tuvalu. Even then virtually every 
report mentioned Tuvalu’s situation in relation to climate change. The discourse on 
climate change has led Tuvalu and Kiribati to become synonymous with the threat 
of sea-level rise, at least for those outside of these states. The view from within 
these communities is, understandably, quite different. Several respondents reacted 
forcefully to the ‘sinking islands’ stereotype and suggested that this was an 
unnecessarily negative and pessimistic portrayal of their communities. By reducing 
representations of themselves to ‘helpless victims’ of climate change they were 
concerned that this limited how the rest of the world both viewed and, therefore, 
valued their culture and future. There was a particular objection to the term ‘eco-
refugee’ as there was a sense that the term ‘refugee’ has negative connotations. If 
relocation were to be an option of last resort then the islanders would want to be 
seen in a positive light by whichever state and society they might migrate to.  
With regard to the methodology employed for this study this is a very complex 
topic, which has been looked at from various perspectives. Jane McAdam (2011, 
2012) has focused on the international legal dimension of possible relocation, with 
a particular focus on the use of the term refugee. This is an important dimension of 
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the topic but one that provides context rather than directly informs this work. 
Similarly there is a growing body of literature looking at how sovereignty as a 
concept is being challenged by various processes of globalisation, for example the 
work of Jean Cohen (2012). Again, this has relevance to the communities in 
question in terms of potential future scenarios where mass migration may become 
necessary and this will raise questions regarding the ability of these states to 
maintain their current level of statehood and sovereignty. This is, literally, an 
existential question and one that cannot be ignored when discussing possible futures 
for these communities. That said, all of the respondents, including government 
officials, emphasized that such scenarios are almost ‘unthinkable’ and they much 
preferred to focus on measures to remain as communities within their current 
sovereign territories. Some statements by President Tong of Kiribati have suggested 
that relocation should be seen as a realistic policy option, but this is a position not 
currently shared by other Pacific Island governments. 
 Although the above points on relocation and potential refugee status are always 
going to have some bearing on any discussion on climate change and sea-level rise, 
this study seeks to acknowledge these issues but also make it clear that this should 
not be the light that casts shadows on the many other factors that contribute towards 
patterns of domestic and international migration. In terms of a theoretical approach 
to inform the chosen methodology discourse analysis is appropriate as it takes into 
consideration the dominant discourse as ‘imposed’ by external commentators 
including, but not exclusively, print and broadcast media. It also places an emphasis 
on hearing the ‘voices’ of the various respondents with recognition of how they are 
viewing their own identities and situations, which is often at odds with popularised, 
shorthand stereotypes. In particular this study draws on the work of Teun A. van 
Dijk (2008a, 2008b, 2009) 
Tuvalu 
The Tuvaluan delegation to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties meeting in 
Copenhagen in 2009 gained worldwide media attention when they castigated the 
major industrialised states for their lack of progress in cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions and other mitigation measures. Environmental organisation such as 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace International were quick to capitalise on this 
and to align themselves with Tuvalu’s position in the negotiations. Protesters at the 
meeting held placards saying ‘We are all Tuvaluans’, both in a sense of solidarity 
with the Tuvaluan delegation but also to demonstrate that what was happening to 
Tuvalu was a microcosm of global trends that highlighted the environmentally 
damaging impacts of capitalism and fundamentally unsustainable patterns of mass 
consumption. Here the discourse on the future of Tuvalu, if not hijacked, was at 
least co-opted in order to further the broader arguments of the international 
environmental movement. 
The above actions were welcomed in Tuvalu as they drew attention to the impacts 
of climate change and helped the case for development assistance to build resilience 
and to fund adaptation strategies. However, as indicated above, although the old 
adage of there being no such thing as bad publicity generally holds true, such action 
did have some unintended consequences. Chimamanda Adichie  has warned of the 
danger of a single story. ‘The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with 
stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one 
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story become the only story’ (Adichie, 2009). Her example referred to the dominant 
discourse in relation to Africa, with its focus on famine, disease and armed conflicts. 
She argued that despite there being some truth within this story it was a very 
selective misrepresentation of the continent. Both Tuvalu and Kiribati are often 
portrayed via the single story of expected relocation due to climate change. As with 
representations of Africa there is some truth in this story, but it is incomplete and, 
therefore, misleading.  
Interviews undertaken in Tuvalu fell into three categories. At the government level 
interviews were conducted with the Prime Minister, Willy Telavi, and Apisai 
Ielemia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and 
Labour, who is also a former Prime Minister. Interviews were also held with 
representatives of AUSAID, NZAID and the European Union as development aid 
donors operating in Tuvalu. At the civil society level interviews were conducted 
with members of various non-governmental organisations, including the Chair of 
the Tuvaluan Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO).  The 
EU-USP GCCA workshop included participants from each of Tuvalu’s inhabited 
atolls and was, therefore, an opportunity to interview residents from each of these 
outer island communities. This also led to further interviews with family members 
of these respondents, who had already relocated to the main atoll of Funafuti.  
At the government level both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister expressed 
concerns regarding their perception of how the international discourse on climate 
change has evolved in recent years at the UNFCCC negotiations and related 
meetings. They drew attention to key words in the discourse beginning with the 
Earth Summit of 1992 and an emphasis on the ‘vulnerability’ of small island 
developing states. This was criticised as being a somewhat negative term that 
implied a lack of agency among these states and a sense of them as powerless 
victims. Whilst there is a large amount of truth in these states possessing a relative 
lack of power and agency in relation to the major industrialised powers criticisms 
of the use of the word vulnerability were acknowledged by the UNFCCC 
signatories. By the turn of the century the discourse had shifted to the seemingly 
more positive use of ‘resilience’ as a key term. Clearly this did not alter the 
fundamental power differential between the small island states and the major 
industrialised powers. Yet both Ministers felt that this was a significant turning 
point in how Tuvalu and other Pacific islands were not only viewed, but also how 
they saw themselves in relation to each other and the rest of the world. 
Another important shift in the use of language and discourse in climate change 
negotiations has been a move from emphasising ‘mitigation’, which has its focus 
on reducing the causes of climate change, to ‘adaptation’. The significance of this 
is twofold. First, it suggests that mitigation measures are, if not completely failing, 
at least operating at too slow a rate to halt or reverse current climate change patterns 
and trends. Second, by moving the discourse to focus more on adaptation this puts 
the onus on the communities most impacted upon to adapt to their changed 
circumstances. The Ministers both highlighted the move from mitigation to 
adaptation as a notable change in discourse with some marked practical 
implications for Tuvalu.  From their perspective this change in use of language was 
driven by the major powers and represented an implicit recognition that mitigation 
measures to date have been inadequate. They feared that whereas mitigation was a 
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clear mandate to reduce greenhouse gas emission, adaptation could be interpreted 
in many different ways. For them the worst case scenario was for the industrialised 
powers to continue to produce greenhouse gasses but attempt to off-set any dissent 
and protest from states such as Tuvalu by ‘buying them off’ with adaptation aid 
packages. In the most extreme future scenario this could mean assistance to relocate 
as the various islands of Tuvalu become increasingly uninhabitable.  
The issue of relocation is something that is an underlying concern for many of the 
groups associated with the umbrella organisation TANGO. Its main office is 
situated close to the airport runway in Funafuti and is regularly surrounded by water 
during high tides. Annie Homasi is the coordinator of this group and part of her 
remit is to engage with communities living in the outer islands of Tuvalu. She 
referred to climate change as an issue for some of these communities mainly in 
terms of diminishing freshwater resources as wells and taro pits became salinated 
during high tides. This has implications for supplies of drinking water and also for 
crop cultivation. The nature of TANGO is such that it encompasses a diverse range 
of groups that focus on environmental sustainability, public health and an array of 
development projects. In some instances TANGO acts as the conduit for the 
delivery of overseas development assistance. It is also in a good position to have a 
broad overview of the situation in the outer islands and what factors are involved 
in the dynamics of any relocation to Funafuti, or beyond. 
 
The ‘single story’ of Tuvalu from an external perspective is quite different at the 
local level. TANGO’s experiences suggest that although there are climate change-
related issues, such as water and food security, among the outer island communities 
these are not necessarily the key motivators for any out migration. More likely 
motivators are for education and job opportunities or to join family members that 
have already relocated. Importantly TANGO’s membership includes residents of 
the outer islands and Homasi was very clear in stating that these individuals and 
communities would much prefer to maintain the majority of their traditional 
lifestyles where they currently reside. She also noted that it would be wrong to think 
of the outer islands and the main island of Funafuti as wholly separate and distinct 
communities. Many of those currently residing in Funafuti continue to identify 
themselves as being from Vaitupu, Nanumea or one of the other outer islands.  
There is also an informal system of remittances being sent to these communities 
from family members in Funafuti and those working overseas. Because these 
transactions are not formally monitored and recorded, the amounts involved are 
difficult to quantify. With this income stream being available to buy imported food 
and other goods there is less of a need for the outer island communities to choose 
between maintaining their traditional subsistence practices or to relocate to the main 
island. This issue of external support to encourage these communities to remain 
where they are is also something that is relevant to the international donor 
community. 
 
International aid packages can be divided into large-scale infrastructure projects, 
household level assistance (such as the provision of rainwater harvesting systems 
and storage tanks) and health and education assistance aimed at individuals. 
Investigating the longer-term commitment of the international donor community 
provides some insight into how they view the likelihood of these communities 
remaining where they are. There would be little incentive or cost-effectiveness in 
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directing long-term funding to communities that may well be relocating in the short 
to medium term. Eventually a tipping-point would be arrived at whereby any 
funding would be better spent in assisting with the relocation process. The donor 
representatives interviewed from AUSAID, NZAID and the EU had a shared 
position on this point. Informally it was recognized that relocation may be 
something that they would be expected to assist with at some point in the future.This 
is not yet stated as a formal aid assistance policy. At best Australia and New Zealand 
have indicated that they are looking at increasing the number of migrants they 
accept each year from the Pacific Islands. Migrant worker schemes are also being 
reviewed, but these are for temporary work contract rather than leading to 
permanent settlement.  
 
The Australian government is contributing US$ 3.19 million towards the World 
Bank-managed Pacific Islands Investment Program. This includes a relocation and 
upgrade of the terminal facilities at Tuvalu’s main Bonriki Airport in Funafuti. This 
is a significant investment and one that suggests Australia, at least, is anticipating 
Tuvalu will require this airline link to be maintained for a reasonable period of time. 
A major infrastructure investment such as this would not be committed to unless 
some return in this investment was anticipated. The more alarmist predictions that 
are such a large part of the discourse related to Tuvalu and climate change might 
appear, therefore, to be somewhat exaggerated. This is not to underestimate the real 
and present danger that some of these communities are facing from storm surges, 
inundation and the loss of productive land. Rather, the ongoing investment from 
various international donor agencies indicates that, notwithstanding these localised 
environmental crises, their broader assessment is of Tuvalu as a viable state for the 
foreseeable future. This is certainly the case for the main urban centre of Funafuti, 
but may not necessarily apply to the same extent for some of the outer island 
communities. 
 
Models of development assistance tend to focus more on supporting the government 
and business hubs of capital cities and their surrounding environs. Much of the 
development assistance in Tuvalu, and most Pacific Islands, is focussed on capacity 
building within government administrations. Bertram and Watters have 
characterised many of the Pacific islands economies as being based on aspects of 
migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy or MIRAB economies (Bertram and 
Watters, 1985; Bertram, 1999 and 2006). This model, either by design or default, 
favours the capital cities and encourages the process of urban drift. It also highlights 
the differences between the more traditional, self-sufficient rural communities and 
the modernised import-dependent urban areas. The issue of urban drift was one that 
formed a consistent theme when discussing possible relocation from Tuvalu’s outer 
islands to the main island of Funafuti. 
 
The discourse that views Tuvalu as a ‘sinking island’ uses very broad brushstrokes 
and sweeping generalisations about the presumed demise of these islands. Of course 
the human impacts as a result of climate change and sea-level rise is felt at the level 
of the individual. Therefore, it is necessary to focus at this level to gain a clearer 
understanding of not only what is actually happening among the outer island 
communities, but also how the islanders there perceive these impacts and how they 
are responding.  
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Interviews with individual islanders revealed some variation in their personal 
circumstances, outlook and feelings towards their possible futures. This is to be 
expected but there was also a remarkable convergence and similarity in relation to 
their views on the causes and consequences of climate change and how they might 
adapt to them. Climate change denial appeared to be non-existent as an attitude with 
every respondent recalling changes that they had personal experience of. This was, 
understandably, more marked among the older respondents. The age range of 
respondents was 16 to 85 years old, but even the youngest among them recounted 
stories of coastal erosion, loss of coconut and pandanus trees and cultivation pits 
becoming unproductive. Whilst many attributed these losses to more extreme 
weather events there was also recognition that some coastal erosion was 
exacerbated by factors such as the building of wharves, sea-walls and other 
construction projects. This is an important point as it both acknowledges that while 
parts of the broader discourse on climate change have some elements of truth, there 
are also other very important factors to be taken into account at the local level. From 
this perspective there is no contradiction in arguing that climate change may be 
having a negative impact on these communities, but there are also other factors that 
the islanders do have some agency over and could alter local practices to lessen the 
negative impacts of climate change.  
 
The above local level insights into the perceptions of and responses to climate 
change are crucial in gaining a clearer understanding of outer islanders’ motivations 
for either remaining in these communities or seeking relocation. Also, it is not until 
questions are asked at this level that certain types of information is revealed that is 
not immediately apparent from outside of these communities. For the majority of 
external observers Tuvalu’s situation is viewed in terms of rising sea-level and an 
increasing inability to be self-sufficient in crop production. The assumption is, 
therefore, that if this situation deteriorates still further then the ‘push’ factor will be 
such that relocation will become inevitable. What this fails to take into account is 
the strength of attachment and emotional ties that bind these communities together, 
and in specific locations. For example, one respondent spoke of their inability to 
leave their parents and grandparents behind if they were to relocate. At first it was 
assumed these were living relatives, but the graves of three generations of this 
family were on the relatively small plot of land occupied by this household. This is 
culturally distinct from many Western societies who deal with death in a very 
different manner and assign relatives’ remains to graveyards some distance from 
the household. Tuvaluan grave sites are often immediately next to living areas and 
it is common to see items of food, drink or other memorial artefacts left on graves 
in remembrance of deceased family members. Several respondents referred to 
visiting and speaking with ancestors when they were having difficulties and in need 
of advice and guidance.  
 
This ‘pull’ factor of attachment to specific land area does not only apply to those 
that are permanent residents in outer island villages. In discussions with former 
residents of Vaitupu and other outer islands who are now resident in the main island 
of Funafuti it was clear that they still felt a very strong sense of attachment to what 
they described as their ‘home island’. They also reported that this feeling was 
something that would be recognized by Tuvaluan Diaspora now living in New 
Zealand or further overseas.  In part this may go some way towards explaining the 
level of remittances which form a small but significant part of the outer island 
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economies and purchasing capabilities. Extended family relations across multiple 
locations, for example Vaitupu, Funafuti and Auckland, are common. This 
facilitates ongoing ties among and between family groups. Physical travel between 
these locations are limited due to prohibitive air fares and other costs. However, 
improvements in information and communication technologies have helped to 
maintain and reinforce these links.  
 
One significant distinction in response to questions about climate change and 
possible relocation was a variance along generational lines. Older respondents were 
more likely to highlight environmental changes they had witnessed, but were also 
the least likely to consider relocation as a possible future for themselves. In contrast 
younger respondents appeared more open to relocation from the outer islands to 
Funafuti and possibly further overseas. In part this can also be explained by the 
perceived likelihood of being able to move. Older respondents would be less likely 
to find education and employment opportunities. There is already a marked 
demographic pattern in many of the outer island villages with young adults being 
the generation that are currently in Funafuti or overseas undertaking training or 
employment. These are often courses or work contracts for a limited period of time, 
although some may lead to more permanent employment and possible residency 
away from their home island. Pursuing education and work opportunities were cited 
far more as factors which may encourage people to relocate then specific climate 
change-related issues. Again this highlights a significant difference in discourse 
between how relocation decisions are understood and arrived at depending on a 
poorly informed ‘single story’ narrative and one that takes into account a wider 
range of local socio-cultural and economic factors. 
 
Kiribati 
 
The interviews conducted in Kiribati followed a similar pattern to those in Tuvalu. 
These also involved government officials, representatives of donor agencies and 
NGOs plus individual I-Kiribati who either resided in outer islands or had moved 
from there to the capital island of Tarawa. 
 
Tuvalu and Kiribati are often jointly cited as being at risk from climate change and 
sea level rise but it is important to note that there are important differences between 
the two states. Whilst they do share some topographical features in that they both 
comprise of low-lying coral atolls the population of Kiribati is ten times that of 
Tuvalu, and spread over an even greater expanse of ocean. Tarawa faces even 
greater strain on its urban infrastructure than Funafuti with a population of 
approximately fifty thousand, of whom only half have mains water supply and 
sanitation facilities. Despite some challenging living conditions the population of 
South Tarawa in particular is continuing to grow. This is partly due to a relatively 
high birth rate but also as there in ongoing in-migration from the outer islands. It 
should be noted though that some of this in-migration is temporary as outer 
islanders move to Tarawa for study and employment opportunities. Usually they 
would move in with family members already residing in Tarawa, thereby 
maintaining and reinforcing familial links with outer island communities.  
 
Kiribati has also set itself apart from Tuvalu and other Pacific island nations by way 
of some of President Tong’s speeches to the UN and on other international 
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platforms where he has indicated that Kiribati is preparing for a time when the 
population will need to relocate. Some external commentators have read this as a 
move towards mass relocation of the whole of the population. However, a closer 
reading of the President’s comments indicate that he is talking about training and 
up-skilling I-Kiribati to enable them to entering job markets elsewhere ‘on merit’. 
This is something that resonates with the Tuvaluan resistance to the term ‘refugee’ 
mentioned above. Being able to find employment outside of Kiribati is not 
impossible, although with the current downturn in the global economy employment 
opportunities are likely to be restricted, especially for someone entering a country 
that is unlikely to have full employment for its own nationals. While President Tong 
may have highlighted a possible solution for a small number of his citizens this will 
not be practical for the vast majority. Mass migration would also involve 
considerably more people than if Tuvalu were to follow a similar course of action. 
Accommodating ten thousand migrants in Australia or New Zealand would be a 
political challenge for either government where immigration and race relations have 
often been the subject of controversy and a lightening rod for some of the minor but 
vocal elements in both states’ electorates.  
 
In an interview with Tessie Lambourne, Kiribati’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs and 
Immigration, she did not attempt to distance herself from President Tong’s position, 
but she did provide a more realistic assessment of how many of the population 
would be willing and able to take up such relocations. While she acknowledged that 
some, particularly younger, I-Kiribati would want to explore studying and working 
abroad she expressed a belief that the vast majority of the population would not. 
She made a distinction between relocation from the outer islands to Tarawa and 
migration overseas. Although a strong sense of communal identity can still be 
identified among I-Kiribati Diaspora, Secretary Lambourne’s view was that most 
aspirations for study and employment could be met in Tarawa without the need to 
venture to other states. As with the Tuvaluan experience the practicalities of 
maintaining relatively close associations with home villages was more manageable 
from within the state rather than the prohibitively expensive overseas travel.  
 
On the discourse of climate change at the international level Secretary Lambourne 
reiterated the Tuvaluan Ministers’ reservations about the apparent shift in emphasis 
from mitigation to adaptation. She was slightly more optimistic in hoping that both 
pathways could be pursued simultaneously. A dominant focus on adaptation 
measures does not necessarily mean that mitigation policies are completely ignored. 
For her the issue of climate change was something that could not be ignored and 
there is clear evidence of the negative impacts it is having not just among the outer 
island communities but also on Tarawa itself with areas such as Golden Beach 
experiencing regular tidal flooding. Yet this was not seen as the priority area for 
government action. More immediately there was a need to address some basic 
infrastructure weaknesses, particularly in the areas of water, sanitation and 
provision of electricity. For those outside of Kiribati who believe in the ‘sinking 
islands’ scenario it may seem strange that climate change is not necessarily viewed 
as the number one priority. Tidal flooding is, by definition, cyclical. It does create 
a degree of inconvenience in that it restricts movement, and it does have an impact 
on the ability to grow crops. That said, the residents of Golden Beach are generally 
not living subsistence lifestyles. Most households have an income and, although 
this may be limited and shared among an extended family with only one or two in 
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paid employment, they have the ability to purchase food. What they are in most 
immediate need of is improved sanitation and power supply. 
 
South Tarawa is a significant urban conurbation with a population far in excess of 
the capacity of its existing infrastructure. This is not usual in many developing 
countries where the growth of urban centres runs ahead of the government’s ability 
to provide a full range of public services for the ever-increasing population. As with 
the investment in upgrading Tuvalu’s main airport it is telling that the international 
donor community is also investing in Kiribati, but on an even larger scale. Chris 
Comerford is the Team Leader for the South Tarawa Sanitation Improvement 
Sector Project. He is responsible for an extremely ambitious development aimed at 
vastly improving the freshwater provision and sewage treatment works of South 
Tarawa. The Asian Development Bank manages this project with the majority of 
the estimated US$22 million budget being supplied by the Australian government. 
It has a twenty-year ‘road map’ to completion, again suggesting long-term 
commitment. Comerford is in no doubt that despite some environmental challenges 
posed by climate change and sea-level rise the donor community is committed to 
maintaining Tarawa, and therefore the territorial and sovereign integrity of Kiribati 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
Donor agencies’ contributions towards projects such as the one above can be 
attributed to a variety of motivations. They may be purely altruistic, or have 
elements of self-interest. The political rhetoric surrounding the international aid 
sector rarely highlights self-interest. This was reflected in the interviews with 
representatives of these agencies in Kiribati. Yet, unlike in Tuvalu, here there was 
an open acknowledgement that neither the governments of Australia or New 
Zealand would actively seek to relocate 100,000 I-Kiribati. While no causal 
connection was explicitly made the impression given was that investing in projects 
that would enable and encourage these islanders to remain where they are would be 
highly preferable to the mass migration alternative. Given only a relatively few 
islanders appear to be actively seeking permanent settlement in either Australia or 
New Zealand this is something of a moot point. Despite this it is worth noting as it 
adds a further dimension to the discourse on climate change and relocation that is 
overlooked in the ‘single story’. 
 
Ben Namikin of the Kiribati Climate Action Network provided significant insights 
from, an NGO perspective. At the time of interviewing he had recently returned 
from the UNFCCC CoP18 meeting in Doha. He noted that the official government 
delegation for Kiribati had a very low-key presence at this meeting compared to 
previous years where President Tong had led the delegation and received a great 
deal of international media coverage. Although not going as far as to say the 
President had boycotted this year’s negotiations Namikin felt that it was a signal of 
Pacific island governments disillusionment with climate change negotiations. The 
Copenhagen Cop15 of 2009 was seen as a missed opportunity to seriously address 
the issue of greenhouse gas emissions. As with earlier respondents noted above, 
Namikin highlighted the significance of the discourse at these negotiations shifting 
from mitigation to adaptation measures. His view was that negotiations at this level 
were, if not meaningless, then certainly not achieving the required progress quickly 
enough. For him, perhaps unsurprisingly given his position, the focus should be on 
the NGO and civil society actors who were working at both the sub-state 
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community level and also developing international networks such as the one he 
belongs to. This was not a complete dismissal of the role of the state, as they remain 
the most powerful players in the international community and control the largest 
budgets. Rather it was a view that two decades on from the Rio Earth Summit 
government negotiations had proceeded at a ‘glacial pace while glaciers melted’. 
For Namikin any meaningful progress is more likely to take place with community 
engagement, education and action. 
 
The outer island of Abaiang has a total population of an estimated 5-6,000. This is 
roughly equivalent to the population of Tuvalu’s capital island, but Abaing is 
significantly larger than Funafuti and the population is spread over a dozen villages 
of varying sizes. All of these villages maintain traditional practices, although some 
have solar-powered electricity and access to limited water facilities. There is a 
twice-weekly light aircraft service to Tarawa, which takes around twenty minutes, 
and irregular boat services, which take two to three hours travel time. As such this 
community retains many of the characteristics of I-Kiribati lifestyles as practiced 
for many generations. Yet they are also within relatively easy reach of the main 
urban centre. The close proximity of Tarawa and Abaiang means that there is a 
greater level of interaction than there would be to some of the more remote outer 
islands, which have no air service and take several days to get to by ferry. The ferry 
service is notoriously unreliable with breakdowns and delays in delivery of spare 
parts meaning that travellers can be marooned on the outer islands for several 
weeks. Abaiang was chosen as the main island for conducting interviews in part 
because of the practicalities of reaching, and returning, from it. More importantly 
though was the level of awareness that the residents of these villages would have 
with regard to life on Tarawa as many of them would have either visited there 
themselves, or would be in regular contact with family members who were living 
there yet often returned to Abaiang. 
 
As with the interviews conducted with outer islanders in Tuvalu those on Kiribati 
had their own individual experiences and stories, yet also shared a remarkable sense 
of community. They recounted evidence of environmental degradation, but 
tempered this by suggesting that only some of this could be accounted for by climate 
change and sea-level rise. Abaiang is larger than most of the atolls of Tuvalu with 
only a small number of construction projects, such as wharves and jetties, that may 
impact on beach degradation and other forms of coastal erosion. Therefore it is 
relatively straightforward to assess which areas have been impacted by such 
construction and which have been impacted solely by the action of wind and waves. 
There is evidence of both in various parts of the atoll. When questioned about the 
impacts of climate change and how to adapt to them few cited these as a reason to 
relocate. Rather they wished to understand better the reasons for these changes, to 
avoid practices which led to these changes (if locally induced) and to seek 
assistance in offsetting the most negative aspects of environmental degradation. 
Relocation was seen as something that was discussed elsewhere rather then in the 
local communities. Residents were aware of this external discourse but, as with the 
Tuvaluan respondents, they were somewhat dismissive of it and, in some case, 
appeared resentful that such views were being promoted by those with what they 
saw as a very limited understanding of Abaiang.  
 
Conclusion 
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By engaging at the community level in the outer islands of both Tuvalu and Kiribati 
a more accurate picture can be drawn of not only the impacts of climate change and 
sea-level rise but also how these are perceived, contextualised and responded to at 
the local level. External discourses tend to rely on scientific reports produced by 
bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which are then 
reported in mainstream media with photographs and footage of the most extreme 
weather events occurring in the islands. This is not to deny the science of the IPCC 
reports or that the events filmed and broadcast did not take place. Yet, recalling 
Adichie’s ‘single story’ these partial representation do not tell the full story. 
 
This study has attempted to distil inputs from the Tuvaluan and Kiribati 
governments, representatives of key international aid donors, relevant NGOs and 
most importantly, members of the outer island communities who are so often 
discussed without their views and opinions being acknowledged and heard. The 
EU-USP Global Climate Change Alliance workshops were very well received in 
the outer island communities they engaged with. Feedback suggested that although 
other donor agencies and their consultants had visited these communities previously 
they tended to come with a pre-determined agenda and solutions to what they 
thought were the problems these communities were facing. The GCCA workshops 
were different in that although they were partially facilitated by USP staff they were 
predominantly managed and led by local in-country coordinators, conducted in the 
local language and had an information-gathering remit, rather then information 
dissemination and direction. In other words these were workshops both ‘by the 
people and for the people’. The discourse that took place within these workshops 
was self-generated and self-reflective. It was often at odds with the externally 
generated discourse on climate change and relocation.  
 
By highlighting the disjunction between the dominant international discourse on 
climate change and how this issue is perceived and experienced within Tuvalu and 
Kiribati, this work raises fundamental questions regarding the implications of the 
‘single story’ of these islands. By placing the islanders at the centre of this analysis 
a more complex, holistic story has emerged. The dominant discourse is only a 
partial story. This risks leading to a partial understanding, a partial analysis, a partial 
diagnosis and the offering of partial solutions. The single story may be more 
straightforward to understand and communicate via mainstream media channels. If 
the single story is flawed then the challenges of climate change, and other relevant 
factors, will not be successfully addressed. To address these challenges requires 
engagement with the communities most impacted and to fully integrate their views 
into future policies.  
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